A New Iraq?

by: Alan Malavolti

Sioux Falls, SD-Except for the men and women of the 552^nd AWACS Wing, Iraq had fallen from most Americans’ radar screens. As if it were a science-fiction movie, Iraq became "uncloaked" following the September 11^th, suddenly appearing as an ominous blip on the not so distant horizon. Saddam Hussein, our personification of evil, had to be, in some way, tied to the dastardly deed. Since September 11^th, we have been reminded of Saddam’s desire to develop weapons of mass destruction and his expulsion of the UN inspectors, we’ve learned of his government’s less than clandestine meetings with known terrorists, and discovered his generosity to the families of suicide-bombers. One wonders if Saddam had learned anything from the Gulf War.

Several conservatives have been clamoring for President Bush to instruct Saddam again, most recently Tom Adkins of commonconservative.com. Speculation on if the U.S. will attack Iraq has turned to when we will strike. Conservative encouragement of another conflict with Iraq is essentially twofold. First, America should finish what it started on January 17, 1991. Saddam Hussein, the supposed problem of the Middle East, must be removed from power. Second, a pro-American government should take his place, rising to power with the same sort of U.S. assistance as we saw in Afghanistan. Before rushing, head long, into another conflict, we should consider the ramifications of such a plan. War Hawks rarely check the depth of the water before diving in for the fish, while the American people can ill-afford not to.

The idea that the American military and our allies did not finish the job is ludicrous and demeaning to the war’s veterans. The resolutions passed by the United Nations in 1990 called for Iraq to leave Kuwait, not the removal of Saddam Hussein. Once the war began, these resolutions were swiftly fulfilled. The objectives, prescribed by international law, had been met; mission accomplished.

Whether or not Saddam Hussein was ever targeted during the war is truly known only by a relatively small number of participants. Only during actual hostilities was the dilemma involving Hussein resolved for the American military. Saddam basically wears two hats. One of these hats is a military beret. As a military leader, Saddam could be a legitimate and legal military target, during hostilities. His other hat is as a head of State. The military does not actively participate in political assassinations. This created a dilemma for the military because, technically, Saddam is a military leader and civilian leader, placing him in a sort of gray area. One might recollect that most pictures of Hussein, during Desert Shield/ Storm, he was wearing a suit and tie, but before and after the war he often dressed in military uniforms. Clearly, he was accentuating his "civilian" leadership status.

Today’s War Hawks are right in saying Hussein should have been eliminated during the war, when he was most readily seen as a military leader. The only real criticism of the military coalition was it moved too effectively, too efficiently in securing Kuwait and the UN resolutions. It missed its only viable opportunity for the military to take Saddam’s power.

The War Hawks claim the Iraqi people are ready to revolt against Hussein’s oppression, that a pro-American government can be easily established. This assessment was accurate ten years ago. Sadly, it became another missed opportunity; one we can never get back.

Immediately following the war, Iraqi Kurds, longtime enemies of Hussein, were encouraged to revolt by the American government. They did try to revolt, but American made two critical mistakes. During the cease-fire negotiations, Iraq asked for and received permission to fly helicopters. Without violating the cease-fire agreement, Hussein easily suppressed the revolt by using guns on his helicopters to slaughter the poorly equipped Kurds. It is doubtful the United States would have agreed to the helicopter clause had it known the intended purpose. But, this is a fact we cannot ignore; a mistake we cannot undo.

Our second critical mistake was failing to support and protect the civil uprising. The real end of the American encouraged revolt came when American support failed to materialize. Though Iraqi helicopters killed many people, the lack of U.S. support and assistance killed the spirit of the revolution. Saddam made it clear that revolutionaries would be killed. The United States made it clear they had nowhere to turn for help.

The years following the war has only increased the animosity of the Iraqi people toward the United States, while greatly solidifying Saddam’s hold on them. Economic sanctions hurt the people, while giving Saddam an opportunity. An opportunity he did not miss. The suffering of the people, Hussein claimed, was a result of the American lead economic sanctions. Their hunger, their lack of medicine, their loss of modernity was, according to Saddam, the fault of the United States. Americans know Saddam misdirected supplies and money, but the Iraqi people don’t know this. All they know is their suffering and it is, apparently, the fault of the United States, or at least of little significance to the United States.

Even our efforts to provide direct aid have lead to mistrust. One example is Operation Provide Comfort, which some participants have called Operation Provide Targets. When Saddam suppressed the revolt and relentlessly pursued the Kurds, many of them fled north toward the Turkey border. American planes, flying humanitarian missions, attempted to airdrop supplies and food to them. Turkey, not wanting the Kurds to enter their country, periodically ordered all aircraft to land, which is the absolute right of a sovereign, host nation. This effectively left the Kurds unprotected and concentrated near the drop areas, making them easy targets.

A New Iraq? The idea is certainly appealing. Perhaps the people of Iraq, as some claim, are ready to revolt. Even if they are ready, they lack the means to be successful. As we have seen, American policy blunders, since the Gulf War, have marred our reputation. A direct intervention by the United States will fail to produce the desired result. We have, in the eyes of the Iraqi people, consistently abandoned them and acted as aggressors in bombing raids. Direct conflict by a U.S. led alliance will only strengthen the Hussein regime. Saddam’s removal will only pave the way for one of his cabinet members, each of whom is as ruthless or more so than Saddam. Given the mistrust and distaste the Iraqis feel toward the United States, it is improbable that they will heed our call to revolt or ever form a completely pro-American government if they did.

To compare Iraq to Afghanistan is erroneous and dangerous. Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq is a political and military force in the Middle East. The Taliban were widely hated by many and loyalty to tribal leaders prevented complete unity. In Iraq, Hussein has the support of the people, though this support may have been achieved by intimidation and brutality. To many, he is even considered a hero. Iraq is sufficiently unified.

The fall of Saddam Hussein and his regime would destabilize Iraq, as well as the entire Middle East. Among the Middle Eastern countries there is a sort of balance of power, exemplified by the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. The removal of either Iran or Iraq would leave the other too powerful and potentially give them control of the region.

Furthermore, Islamic countries of the Middle East generally have a strong dislike for one another, except on two counts. One is Israel. The very existence of Israel, despite recent Arab rhetoric, is a rallying point to all Muslim nations. Second, they will unite against non-Arab nations that intervene in an Islamic country. For example, animosity toward Saudi Arabia by its neighbors, as well as Osama Bin Laden, centers on Saudi’s refusal to expel the infidels, American military, from Islam’s most holy soil. Desert Storm may appear to be a contradiction of this point, however it is actually a verification of it. Iraq, by invading a another Arab country, threatened to destroy the balance of power that seems so critical to the nations of the gulf. Western intercession was, therefore, acceptable. To emphasize this point, some American servicemen, who arrived early in August 1990, were told by Kuwaiti exiles that they disliked Americans, but were willing to allow them to recover their country for them.

The United States, with some difficulty, may be able to build a Western coalition, but it is doubtful any Arab State will give its full support. Not only does the end of Hussein’s regime threaten to destabilize the region, so does a Western coalition that includes an Arab State. A Muslim nation that provides support will create factionalism among its Islamic neighbors.

Today’s War Hawks have failed to consider the Middle East’s past and our failed involvement in their history. Moreover, they fail to realize Gun Boat Diplomacy has gone out of vogue with Teddy Roosevelt’s Administration. Military intervention is likely to cause far more harm than good.

Logic and reality dictate that there is little hope for a New, pro-American, Iraq. Yet, the world cannot allow Saddam to continue pursuing weapons of mass destruction or funding terrorists. Strict and enforceable economic sanctions must force him to allow UN weapons inspectors back into Iraq. We shouldn’t be so naïve as to think they will ever be granted unlimited access. The presence of inspectors causes Hussein to play a shell game with his weapons programs, which will dramatically slow research and development. Simultaneously, covert operations, utilizing human intelligence collecting, can yield target information, followed by the standard "industrial accident."

The world may be a much safer place, certainly it would be a better place, had Saddam Hussein never risen to power or been removed at the right time. We may never know. Our opportunities have been lost forever. We must now find some method of working with, or around, Hussein to regain the trust of the Iraqi people, halt his weapons programs, and combat terrorist activities supported by Saddam. Utilizing military forces to directly intervene, at this time, threatens American lives, American interests, and American perceptions by foreign peoples.

Alan Malavolti is a contributing writer for PurePolitics.com who lives in Sioux Falls, SD.